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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
run in the seamless weave of the law tends to lengthen. Where
will it end?
It is submitted that a return to first principles should be ef-
fected. Article 333 should be amended to read as it did in the Code
of Practice of 1825. The code provision which caused the initial
difficulty in Magee v. Dunbar should be amended so as to over-
rule the doctrine of this case and do nothing more.". In this way
Louisiana will not only solve the problem without producing un-
fortunate consequences, but the return to our earlier practice
would bring us results quite similar to those effected by the new
Federal Rules. 2
Guy WIMBERLY, JR.
DURATION AND REVOCABILITY OF AN OFFER
The basic principles and practical application of Articles
1800-1804 and 1809 of the Louisiana Revised Civil Code of 1870,
dealing with the duration of an offer and the timeliness of an ac-
ceptance, have never been explained satisfactorily as a system.
It is the purpose of this comment to attempt an explanation of
them in terms of their probable origin and in conformity with the
theories accepted at the time of their redaction.
The Civil Code of 18081 and the Code Napoleon2 were almost
identical in the title of Obligations; they contained no specific
rules on offer and acceptance and only provided that the consent
of the party obligating himself was essential to the formation of
the contract.' The articles here under consideration were first
41. Art. 317, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 85 of
1922, should be further amended so as to read as follows: "It shall be suffi-
cient in all cases for a defendant to file his answer at any time before the
confiirmation of a judgment taken by default against him; provided, however,
that no exceptions incorporated in any answer filed after a judgment of de-
fault has been rendered against defendant shall be admitted."
42. Cf. Rule 12, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1. A Digest of the Civil Laws now in force in the Territory of Orleans,
with Alterations and Amendments adapted to its Present System of Govern-
ment (1808).
2. Le Code Civil des Frangais (1804) (commonly referred to as the "Code
Napoleon").
3. La. Civil Code of 1808, p. 261, 3. 3. 8; Art. 1108, French Civil Code. The
rules of offer and acceptance were considered within the field of evidence
and not substantive law. See Art. 1797, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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proposed in the Projet of the Louisiana Civil Code of 18254 and
entered our law as Articles 1794-1798 and 1803 of that Code.
Therefore, in determining the meaning of the articles, research
should be centered on the source materials available in 1822, the
year in which the code revision committee was appointed.5
Of course, the works of Domat and Pothier's treatise on Obli-
gations were available and were used by the members of this
commission.6 And since the Civil Code of 1808 so closely corre-
sponded to the Code Napoleon in the title of Obligations, it is only
reasonable to assume that the redactors were acquainted with
and used the available French commentaries. When they under-
took in 1822 to amplify the rules of offer and acceptance, the
works of Toullier7 and Delvincourt were the only ones which had
been published,9 the former being by far the more satisfactory.10
Not to be neglected, however, are the old Germanic Civil Codes,",
which may have been available, especially the Prussian, 2 the
Projet of which had been translated into French in 1751,18 and
the promulgated text of which was translated by the members of
the French bureau on foreign legislation in 1801.14 The effect
which these translations may have had on French legal doctrine
will be discussed in the course of this comment.
There can be no doubt that Toullier's commentary formed
the basis of the Louisiana articles here considered. This view
4. Proposed Additions and Amendments to the Civil Code of the State
of Louisiana, by the Jurists Commissioned for that Purpose (1823). This Is
commonly referred to as the "'Projet" and was republished by the State of
Louisiana as Louisiana Legal Archives, vol. I (1937).
5. La. Acts 1822, pp. 108, 109 (resolution approved March 14, 1882).
6. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law (1932) 6 Tulane L. Rev. 280,
289 (also in 1 La. Legal Archives xvii, xxvi).
7. Toullier, Le Droit Civil Frangais (1st ed. 1812). The 4th ed. (1824) was
used by the author, earlier editions being unavailable.
8. Delvincourt, Cours de Droit Civil (1st ed. 1813). The 3d ed. (1824) was
used by the author, earlier editions being unavailable.
9. Tucker, supra note 6, at 290 (also in 1 La. Legal Archives xvii, xxvi)
includes also Maleville, Analyse Raison6 de la Discussion du Code Civil au
Conseil d'Etat (1805). Maleville's work was not a true commentary, however,
but rather, as indicated by its title, an analysis of the Civil Code based on
the legislative discussions.
10. Ibid. See also Dard, Code Civil des Frangais (3d ed. 1827) ij.
11. Bavarian Civil Code (1756) and Austrian Civil Code (1811). For the
Prussian Codifications, see infra notes 12-14.
12. Allgemeines Landrecht fUr die preussischen Staaten (1794).
13. Code Frederic; ou Corps de Droit pour les Etats de Sa Majest6 le Rol
de Prusse. Traduit de 'Allemand par A. A. de C. (1751).
14. Code G~n~ral pour les Etats Prussiens, Traduit par les Membres du
bureau de Lgislation 6trang~re, et publi6 par l'ordre du Ministre de la
Justice (An IX (1801)).
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has been expressed at least twice within recent years,15 and it is
substantiated by the similarity in the language and plan of the
Louisiana Civil Code to the work of Toullier.16 The origin of
Article 1798 can be recognized readily,1 7 and Articles 1799,1 1800,19
1803, -0 1804,21 1805-1808,22 1809,- 1810,24 1811,25 1816,26 and 1817 2
can also be identified. Therefore, of the articles involved in this
discussion only 1801 and at, first blush, 1802, have no counterpart
in the text of Toullier. Since the Louisiana order of treatment is
the same as that of Toullier, the nature of the two Louisiana
provisions (Articles 1801, 1802) not found in Toullier is more
readily understood as limitations on the principle announced in
Article 1800. This will be further discussed below.
It is well to remember that the texts of these articles in the
Revised Civil Code of 1870 are the same as the corresponding
English texts in the Civil Code of 1825, the latter being transla-
tions of the original French.28 Since there are serious discrepan-
cies between the two versions of the articles being interpreted, 29
and since in any case of discrepancy the French text of the Civil
Code of 1825 is controlling today, 0 this version has been made the
basis of the present inquiryA1
There can be no doubt that a contract is not legally formed
and binding until the proposition is accepted by the person to
15. Tucker, supra note 6, at 290. See Comment (1935) 9 Tulane L. Rev.
590, 599-601, which sufficiently refutes the statement in Comment (1931) 5
Tulane L. Rev. 632, n. 5, to the effect that these articles were based on the
common law.
16. A concordance between the texts of Toullier and some of the articles
being discussed may be found in Comment (1935) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 590, 599-
601, n. 69 et seq. See also infra notes 17-27.
17. 6 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 7, Bk III, Tit. III, no 24, par. 1.
18. Id. no 24, pars. 2, 3.
19. Id. no 24, par. 6.
20. Id. no 25.
21. Id. no 26, par. 1.
22. Id. nos 27, 28.
23. Id. no 29 and n. 2; see also no 30.
24. Id. no 31, particularly par. 5, sent. 3 et seq., and par. 6, sent. 11.
25. Id. no 33, par. 1.
26. Id. no 33, pars. 4, 5.
27. Id. no 34.
28. Dubuisson, The Codes of Louisiana (Originals Written in French;
Errors in Translation) (1924) 25 La. Bar Ass'n Rep. 143, 144 et seq. See also
Tucker, supra note 6, at 291 (also in 1 La. Legal Archives xvii, xxvii).
29. For the seriousness of some discrepancies in text resulting from
mistranslations, see Dubuisson, supra note 28.
30. Phelps v. Reinach, 38 La. Ann. 547 (1886); Straus v. City of N. 0., 166
La. 1035, 118 So. 125 (1928); Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931)
(cited in Tucker, supra note 6, at 291, n. 43).
31. Accordingly, the author's translation will be used in the text, but in
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whom it has been made, ' 2 and it is equally clear that once the
acceptance is legally made, the contract is complete, and either
party may have it enforced judicially 58 The problem is to fix
the time at which the acceptance should be considered binding,
assuming for the moment that the proposition is open and that
all formalities are fulfilled.
According to Article 1797,34 since consent is purely a mental
operation it can have no effect unless it is manifested in such a
manner as to be understood by the other contracting party. In
the case of face to face offers the matter is simple for when the
person signifies his acceptance the contract is complete. Difficulty
is encountered in the case of absent parties. If the consent is
binding at the moment that the party declares his acceptance
(as by writing a letter), then the revocation of the proposal after
that time, though the acceptance may not have been known to
the proposer, would be inoperative. On the other hand, if the
acceptance is not binding until it is received by or comes to the
knowledge of the proposer, then either party may still retract.
Article 181935 defines consent as "concurrence of intention...
reciprocally communicated." But an acceptance is not communi-
cated if the party proposing has not received knowledge of it,
even though the other party may have declared his intention and
entrusted its delivery to agencies beyond his control. According
to Article 1809,36 the obligation of a contract is not complete until
such cases both the official French and English versions will be given in the
footnotes.
32. Art. 1800, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The contract, consisting of a propo-
sition and the consent to it, the agreement is Incomplete until the acceptance
of the person to whom it is proposed. If he, who proposes, should before that
consent is given, change his intention on the subject, the concurrence of the
two wills is wanting, and there is no contract."
33. Art. 1803, La. Civil Code of 1870: "But when one party proposes, and
the other assents, then the obligation is complete, and by virtue of the right
each has impliedly given the other, either of them may call for the aid of the
law to enforce it." See also Art. 1799.
34. Art. 1797, La. Civil Code of 1870: "When the parties have the legal
capacity to form a contract, the next requisite to its validity is their consent.
This being a mere operation of the mind, can have no effect, unless it be
evinced in some manner that shall cause it to be understood by the other
parties to the contract ..."
35. Art. 1819, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Consent being the concurrence of
Intention in two or more persons, with regard to a matter understood by all,
reciprocally communicated, and resulting in each party from a free and
deliberate exercise of the will, it follows that there Is no consent, not only
where the intent has not been mutually communicated or implied. .. "
36. Art. 1809, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The obligation of a contract not
being complete, until the acceptance, or In cases where it is implied by law,
until the circumstances, which raise such implication, are known to the
party proposing; . . ." This is fully in accord with the views expressed in 6
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the acceptance is known to the proposer, or in cases where
the acceptance is presumed by law, until the circumstances which
give rise to such presumption are known. Article 181087 contains
the exception that "if the contract be accepted before the death -
of the party offering it, although he had no notice of it, the obli-
gation is complete." This exception makes the meaning of Article
1809 more certain.38
Since the acceptance is not binding until the proposer re-
ceives knowledge of it, the next point to be considered is the time
within which the acceptance must be received in order to be
operative. According to Article 1800:
".... If he, who proposes, should before that consent is given,
change his intention on the subject, the concurrence of the
two wills is wanting, and there is no contract."39 (Italics sup-
plied)
And by Article 1804:
"The acceptance need not be made by the same act, or in
point of time, immediately after the proposition; if made at
any time before the person who offers or promises has changed
his mind, or may reasonably be presumed to have done so,
it is sufficient." (Italics supplied)
Thus, the acceptance is binding if knowledge of it reaches the
Toullier, supra note 7, at no 29, according to whom mere knowledge, even
though not acquired by means of an official communication, suffices.
37. Art. 1810, La. Civil Code of 1870: "If the party making the offer, die
before it is accepted, or he to whom it is made, die before he has given his
assent, the representatives of neither party are bound, nor can they bind
the survivor. But if the contract be accepted before the death of the party
offering it, although he had no notice of it, the obligation is complete . . ."
33. The question as to when an acceptance becomes binding gives rise
to that of the date of the contract. Although the obligations of a contract are
not binding until knowledge of the acceptance comes to the proposer, it must
be inferred from Article 1810 (supra note 37) that the contract dates from
the declaration or act of acceptance. This view, expressed in 6 Toullier, op.
cit. supra note 7, Bk. III, Tit. III, nos 24, 26, 31, was severely criticized by
Spinnael (Annotations Critiques sur la Doctrine de M. Toullier, tome 2, pp.
11-19, notes on Bk. III, Tit. III) for inconsistency in theory. There is no
inconsistency in theory, however, if the contract is regarded as conditionally
complete at the time of the declaration or act of acceptance, the condition
being non-revocation of the acceptance by the acceptor and non-revocation
of the offer before the proposer receives knowledge of the declaration or act
of acceptance. The proposer having died without changing his acceptance,
the contract is binding. The theory is found in the German (B.G.B., Arts.
151, 153), Japanese (Civil Code, Arts. 97, 256), and particularly, the Brazilian
(Civil Code, Art. 1088) law. Cf. Comment (1935) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 590, 601,
which correctly states that the information theory should be followed in
Louisiana in determining whether a contract is binding, but which seems to
infer that the contract dates from the receipt of information by the proposer.
39. For complete text of Article 1800, see note 32, supra.
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proposer before he has changed his intention, or before the lapse
of so long a period after the making of the offer that he would
be presumed to have changed his intention.40 Since there is no
requirement that this be expressed or declared in any manner
before receipt of the acceptance, it must be concluded from the
face of these articles that the mere change of intention (even if
unexpressed) prevents the concurrence of wills and bars the com-
pletion of the contract. 1 This may seem impractical, and unjust
to the party accepting because it would give him no security
regarding the formation of the contract; and this would certainly
be true if it were not for the limitations imposed by Articles 1801,
1802, and 1809, which make the principle more intelligible and
practical.
Article 1800, which provides that there can be no contract if
the proposer changes his intention before receipt of the accept-
ance, is followed by the first limitation on the proposer's freedom
to revoke-in Article 1801:
"The party proposing shall be presumed to continue in the
intention, which his proposal expressed, if, on receiving the
unqualified assent of him to whom the proposition is made, he
do not signify the change of his intention."
Thus, if the proposer is no longer of the intention to contract
when the acceptance comes to his knowledge, he must notify the
other party immediately or he will be presumed to have con-
tinued in his original intention and the contract will be con-
40. This article must not be interpreted as expressing a "reasonable
time" in the common law sense. The civil law principle is that the proposal re-
mains open until revoked. See infra at note 61. Of course, this theory was
never applied in the case of an acceptance arriving so long after the making
of the proposition that it could not be deemed a reply. See infra at note 62.
This is the meaning of Article 1804. See Dickson v. Dickson, 32 La. Ann. 272,
275 (1880).
41. Moreover, this is the only possible interpretation which can be
given. If a manifestation of the change of intention were required, then
Article 1801 would have to be interpreted as permitting a revocation after
acceptance. This would be directly contrary to the express provisions of
Articles 1800, 1803, 1804, and 1809 (contra: Comment (1931) 5 Tulane L. Rev.
632, 634). The principle is not unique or original in Louisiana law. The
Prussian Civil Code (Part 1, tit. 5, Art. 104) required the proposer to send
immediate notice to the other party of a change of intention, but even if he
failed to do so, he was not bound unless it was apparent that the acceptance
arriving late had been dispatched in due time, and the proposer's liability
was in damages for the injury caused and not on a contract. The modern
German (B.G.B., Art. 151) and Japanese (Civil Code, Art. 527) law changed
the rule so that the contract is considered binding in such cases, but the




sidered complete.4 2 If this stood as the only limitation, the party
accepting could not be certain of the binding effect of the contract
until the lapse of such time as would be necessary for the pro-
poser's notice of change of intention to reach him. However, no
such inconvenience and loss of time is necessary if the acceptor
acts upon the proposal within the proper time. Thus after repeat-
ing that the obligation of a contract is not binding until knowl-
edge of the acceptance is received, Article 1809 continues:
"... he may therefore revoke his offer or proposition before
such acceptance, but not without having allowed to pass the
reasonable time which he may have given to the other party
by the terms of his proposition, or which he is presumed to
have given him, according to the circumstances of the case, for
making known his determination."' 8
From this article, it seems to be clear that the proposer cannot
revoke his offer: (1) during the period he has given the other
party within which to make known the latter's acceptance (in
other words, for the duration of the "option" which the offer
contained) ;44 or (2) during the time that he is presumed to
have given the other party for that purpose, the duration of
which depends upon the circumstances of the case. In the lat-
ter situation this is the provision for an "option" (if the term
may be so used) which is implied and presumed 11 in every
42. By means of this presumption the Louisiana Civil Code avoids viola-
tion of the principle that there can be no contract if the proposer changes his
intention (Art. 1800), and gives more security to the party accepting than if
the proposer were required merely to answer in possible damages.
43. (Author's translation.) The official French and the English texts are
as follows:
" ... ells pet, avant cette acceptation, rdvoquer son offre, aprds avoir
toutefois laissd passer le temps raisonable qu'elle peut avoir donnd d l'autre
partie, par les termes de sa proposition, ou qu'eell est censde liu avoir donnd,
d'aprds les circonstances, pour faire connaltre sa determination." (Art. 1803,
La. Civil Code of 1825)
" ...He may therefore revoke his offer or proposition before such ac-
ceptance, but not without allowing such reasonable time as from the terms
of his offer he has given, or from the circumstances of the case he may be
supposed to have intended to give the other party, to communicate his de-
termination."
The phrase "supposed to have intended to give" Is misleading and does
not connote the presumption of the French text.
44. This term or delay may be given expressly or Impliedly. 6 Toullier,
op. cit. supra note 7, Bk. III, Tit. III, no 30. The question arises, however,
whether the proposer would be held bound to his offer for the full time
which he has given, regardless of the length of the period. Certainly no
court would hold him to It if it was unreasonably long, because Article 1809
provides that the proposer is Irrevocably bound for the reasonable time
which he has given. See note 45, infra.
45. Although there is nothing in the Louisiana Civil Code specifically
denying to the proposer the power of stipulating against this presumption,
[Vol. I
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offer.4" And since the "option" and the simple offer are basically
the same-the only difference being that the duration of the pe-
riod of irrevocability is in one case determined by the proposer
himself and in the other by law-whatever is said of the one
applies with equal force to the other.
4
1
An apparent similarity to the language of Article 1809 is found
in Article 1802:48
"The party [proposing] is bound by his proposition and cannot
withdraw it . . . if this consent [of the accepter] is given
within the period of time that the party proposing is presumed
to have given, taking into consideration the situation of the
parties and the nature of the contract."'49
The duration of the period of irrevocability based upon the pre-
sumption that time is given for acceptance during which the pro-
poser cannot revoke his offer, is made to depend upon the "situa-
tion of the parties and the nature of the contract." It is only
reasonable to assume that the "circumstances of the case" in
Article 1809, mean the "situation of the parties and the nature
of the contract" in Article 1802.
it might be so inferred from Article 1809 which provides for the reasonable
time which the proposer has given or Is presumed to have .given. Thus the
proposer, in granting a delay, would have to grant one at least as long as
that which he is presumed to have granted. It would be a question whether,
in the case where the delay granted is less than the legal delay, the proposal
should be presumed to imply the legal delay or be considered of no effect as
an offer.
46. Since both of these delays or "options" are legal rather than conven-
tional obligations, there can be no question of any need of consideration for
their efficacy or support. See note 47, infra.
47. Whether or not Article 1809 is still in effect as far as it relates to
options to buy or to sell in view of Article 2462 (as amended by La. Act 249
of 1910, Act 3 of 1910 (2 E.S.), and Act 27 of 1920) will not be considered in
this Comment; it is however certain that Article 1809 still applies to all
options other than those to buy or sell.
48. (Author's translation.) The official French and the English texts are
as follows:
"La partie est ZWde par sa proposition ot ne peut la retirer, a4 else a
dtd faite dana des termes qui annonce l'intsntion de donner d l'autro partie
to droit de conclure Io contrat par son consentement; et si 0e consentement
est donngi dans 'espace de temps que la partie proposante est prdsumde avoir
accord6, eu 6gard 4 la situation des parties et 4 la nature du contrat."
(Art. 1796, La. Civil Code of 1825)
"He is bound by his proposition, and the signification of his dissent will
be of no avail, if the proposition be made in terms, which evince a design to
give the other party the right of concluding the contract by his assent; and
if that assent be given within such as the situation of the parties and the
nature of the contract shall prove that It was the intention of the proposer
to allow."
The comment in note 43 supra, also applies to this article.
49. The omitted clause reads as follows: "if the proposition be made in
terms, which evince a design to give the other party the right of conclud-
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The first impression of "according to the situation of the
parties," is that it may have reference to the physical presence or
absence of the parties. And if we accept this view without proof
for the moment, the time reasonably necessary for the communi-
cation of the acceptance need not be more than but a moment if
the parties are in the presence of each other; whereas in other sit-
uations, the time reasonably necessary would be that ordinarily
required for the transmission of intelligence by the authorized or
usual means of communication. In this respect, contracts made in
the present day by telephone or by radio should be interpreted as
contracts by parties in the presence of each other.
The meaning of the other phrase, the "nature of the contract"
is somewhat difficult to determine. It may possibly refer to the
time which would be required for acceptance or rejection in the
light of the seriousness of the contract contemplated. Such an in-
terpretation would evidently be contrary to the policy of a sys-
tem which regulates the time for transmission of the acceptance,
because it would introduce an element of uncertainty in the du-
ration of the period of irrevocability; whereas the time to be al-
lowed for the transmission of the acceptance could be determined
as an objective fact with little difficulty, the exact time to be al-
lowed for the act of acceptance would be largely a matter of
opinion.
Perhaps a better interpretation might be that the phrase re-
fers to the "nature of the contract" in the sense of its unilateral or
bilateral character at the moment of inception50 Thus if the
proposer requests a promise, the acceptance can be made in only
a moment. But if he requests an act or a forbearance, the act of
acceptance can not be complete until the act or forbearance is
Ing the contract by his assent" (see note 48, supra). The meaning of this
clause is at first confusing in that an offer is not in reality an offer to con-
tract unless the party making it intends to be bound. The term "offer,"
however, was and is still used in France for invitations to do business and
other proposals the "acceptance" of which require acceptance by the party
inviting or proposing the contract. Examples of these "offers" are the lists
or catalogs published by merchants, who have the right to change the prices
without notice. See Pardessus, Cours de Droit Commercial (1st ed. 1814-16;
3d ed. 1821 used by the author) nos 250, 269; 6 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6
Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1930) nos 127, 128. See also Toullier, op.
cit. supra note 7, Bk. III, Tit. III, no 24, pars. 2, 3; Id. no 25, note 3, where
the commentator points out that the proposer may reserve the right of re-
jecting the acceptance; and Pothier, Trait6 des Obligations, no 3, par. 5 et
seq. (2 Pothier, Oeuvres (Bugnet ed. 1861) 4).
50. It is always at this point that the character of the contract is de-
termined; and whether there exists an obligation on only one or on both
parties at the time the proposal ripens into a contract by the acceptance is
what determines its unilateral or bilateral nature. See note 51, infra.
[Vol. I
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fully performed, and until then the offer can not be converted
into a binding obligation by completion of the contract.51 Thus, an
offer to pay the offeree a sum of money to build a certain type of
house for the party proposing, would remain open by the opera-
tion of law until such time had elapsed as might be necessary for
the building of that type of house,52 and if the house were com-
pleted in such time, the contract would be complete. This inter-
pretation is fully in accord with the policy of the Louisiana Civil
Code regarding the term to be allowed for the performance of an
obligation.8
However, unless the proposer has so stipulated, the fact that
the acceptance does not come to- his knowledge within the time
given or reasonably necessary for its communication does not
imply that it can be of no effect. As previously stated,54 Article
1804 merely requires that the acceptance arrive before the pro-
poser has changed his intention, or before the lapse of so long a
period that the proposer could not reasonably be presumed to
have the same intention. Thus an acceptance which arrives late
will nevertheless operate to complete the contract if the proposer
is still of the intention expressed in his offer. The only loss to the
party accepting is that he is not assured of the acceptance com-
pleting the contract, for after the lapse of time given by the pro-
poser or reasonably necessary for the communication of the accep-
tance, the proposer is free to change his intention; and even if the
proposer has changed his intention, his failure to notify the ac-
cepter immediately will cause him to be bound.55
51. This would be an unilateral contract because there would be an
obligation on one of the parties alone, the other having fulfilled his part in
performing the act which constituted acceptance. Cf. Art. 36, Italian Com-
mercial Code, which provides that offers for bilateral contracts may be
revoked before acceptance (with certain limitations), but that offers for
unilateral contracts are binding on the proposer from receipt of the offer by
the other party.
52. In determining the time to be allowed, the law does not consider the
ability of the particular party but rather the objective possibility of per-
formance. Arts. 1891, 2033, La. Civil Code of 1870.
53. Cf. Art. 2050, La. Civil Code of 1870: "When no term is fixed by the
parties for the performance of an obligation, it may ("should" would be cor-
rect for the French doit) be executed immediately, unless, from the nature
of the act, a term, either certain or uncertain, must be implied. Thus, an
obligation to pay money, without any stipulation for time, may be enforced
at the will of the obligee. But a promise to make a crop of sugar Is neces-
sarily deferred, until the uncertain period when the cane shall be fit to cut."
Cf. Prussian Civil Code, Part 1, tit. 5, art. 101 (Infra note 57).
54. Supra note 40, and text supported thereby.
55. Whether or not an offer remains open after the expiration of the
stipulated or legal delay depends upon the manner in which the offer has
been made. If the proposer has agreed merely to hold open his offer for a
19381
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Thus it appears, in effect, that there are three periods to the
offer: first, the period given for acceptance, or if none has been
given, that reasonably necessary for the communication of the
proposal and the acceptance, during which the proposal is pre-
sumed to be open; second, the period after the expiration of the
above delays, during which the proposal is not presumed to be
open, but during which an acceptance coming to the proposer's
knowledge will be considered binding upon him if he does not
notify the acceptor immediately that he has changed his inten-
tion; and third, the period so long after the making of the offer
that the proposer cannot be presumed in any event to be still of
the intention which his proposal expressed, during which the ar-
rival of an acceptance cannot be considered more than a counter
offer.
In order to ascertain how such principles entered Louisiana
law, the inquiry should include an examination of the commen-
taries on the Code Napoleon which were available to the Louisi-
ana redactors. Toullier, after explaining that the proposer is
bound to maintain his offer for the time he has given expressly
or impliedly to the other party for acceptance, 6 points out the
rule of the Prussian Civil Code57 requiring that the proposer keep
certain time, it may not be implied necessarily that the offer lapses after
such delay. On the other hand, the proposer might so stipulate in his offer,
or might even provide for the maximum duration of the offer without obli-
gating himself to maintain the offer after the lapse of the legal delay. In
the modern German (B.G.B., Art. 146), Japanese (Arts. 521, 523) and Bra-
zilian (Art. 1086) Civil Codes, the offer is considered of no effect after the
lapse of the stipulated or legal delay.
56. 6 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 7, Bk. III, Tit. III, no 30.
57. Prussian Civil Code, Arts. 90-105. The principal articles, as translated
by the French bureau of foreign legislation (supra note 14), with English
translations by the author, are as follows:
Art. 94. "Ist bei dem Antrage wegen der Zeit zur Annahme gar nichts
bestimmt worden, so muss die Erkirung iber einen mtindlichen Antrag so-
gleich, als derselbe geschehen 1st, abgeben werden."
" Si au moment de l'offre on n'a rien ddtermind relativement au temps de
1'acceptatlon, il faut que la ddclaration sur une offre faite verbalement soit
donde aussitdt que celle-ci a dt faite."
"If at the moment of the offer nothing has been determined as to the
time for acceptance, it is necessary that the declaration on an offer made
verbally be given as soon as the offer has been made."
Art. 96. "Ist der Antrag unter Abwesenden schriftlich geschehen, so
kommt es au den Zeitpunkt an, da der Brief an dem Oste, wo der Andere
sich auhalt, nach dem gew6hnlichen Laufe der Posten hat eingehen konnen."
"Si l'offre entre des absens a M faite par l'Hcrit, cela dupendra du mo-
ment o- la lettre, d'aprds le cours ordinaire des postes, aura pn arriver d l'en-
droit o4 reside L'autre partle."
"If an offer between absent parties has been made in writing, [the time
to be allowed by the proposer] shall depend upon the time when the letter,




open his offer and not be permitted to revoke it for such time as
may be necessary to transmit the acceptance to him.58 Delvin-
court does likewise and adds that he presumes the law would be
the same in France. 9 That both available French commentaries
discussed and advocated the rule of the Prussian Civil Code, is a
Art. 97. "Mit der niichsten Fahrenden oder reitenden Post, welche nach
diesem Zeitpunkte abgeht, muss der Antrag beantwortet werden."1
"Il faut que celle-ci r6ponde sur l'ofire 4 la premidre posts qui part aprds
'avoir regue."
"This party must reply to the offer by the first mail leaving after its
receipt."
Art. 101. "Gesohiet der Antrag einer Corporation oder Gemeine, so muss
der Antragende auf die erklirung derselben so lange Zeit warten, als er/or-
derlich ist, dass fiber den Antrag sin verfassungsmdssiger Entschluss genom-
men und im bekannt gemacht werden kanne."
"Si l'offre a dtd faite d une corporation ou commune, Poffrant doit atten-
dre la declaration pendant tout le temps n~cessaire pour qu'il soit pris sur
l'offre une rdsolution conforme aux lois, et qu'elle puisse lui 6tre communi-
ques."
"If the offer has been made to a corporation or community, the offeror
should await the declaration for the length of time which may be necessary
for adopting a resolution according to law, and for its communication to
him."
Art. 103. "Bobald aber die vorstehend §§ 90 sqq. bestimmten Fristen zur
Erklarung fiber den Antrag fruchtlos verlaufen sind, kann der Antragende
zuriicktreten."
"AussitOt quo les delais fixds (90 et suiv.) pour la declaration sur P'ofire
sont expires sans effet, Pofjrant est libre de retirer ses offres."
"As soon as the delays fixed (90 et seq.) for declaration on the offer have
expired, the offeror is free to revoke his offer."
58. "Le principe que Pacceptation, lorsqu'elle n'est pas connue, n'empdche
pas la rdvocation des offres, sert 4 rdsoudre la question suivante. J'dcris le
ler janvier d un n~gociant, pour lui demander une partie de marchandises
4 tel prix. Le 5, il me rdpond qu'il accepts ma proposition, et qu'il m'exp6-
diera les marchandises. Sa rtponse arrive 4 Rennes le 8, mats Is 7 j'avais
4crit pour rdvoquer ma demands. L'acceptation m'dtant alors inconnue, la
rdvocation est-elle valide? Ells est sans doute dans la rigueur des principes.
Cependant, ne peut-on pas dire qu'en faisant une ofire par lettre, on s'oblige
tacitement de ne pas la rdvoquer avant le retour du courrier, ou avant le
temps ndcessaire pour recevoir la rdsponse? Cette d6cision est plus con-
forme 4 i'dquitd, et c'est aussi cells qu'adopte le Code prussien, 1re part.,
tit. 5 no. 96." 6 Toullier, op. cit. supra note 7, Bk. III, Tit. III, no 29, note 2.
"The principle that the acceptance, when it is not known, does not pre-
vent the revocation of an offer, serves to solve the following question. I
write to a merchant on Jan. 1st, requesting certain merchandise at a certain
price. On the 5th he answers that he accepts my proposition and that he will
send me the merchandise. His reply arrives in Rennes on the 8th, but on the
7th I had written a revocation of my order. The acceptance then being
unknown to me, is the revocation valid? It is without doubt in a strict
application of the principles. However, may it not be said that in making
an offer by letter, one tacitly obliges himself not to revoke it before return
mail, or before the time necessary for receipt of the answer? This decision
is more in accord with equity, and it is also that which is adopted by the
Prussian Code, Part 1, tit. 5, no 96."
The fact that the Louisiana Civil Code incorporates this view has been
shown previously in Comment (1935) 9 Tulane L. Rev. 590, 600-601.
59. "Mais de quand est censde faite la vente par correspondance? Du
jour que l'ofrant a eu connoissance de 'acceptation des ofires. Mais quid,
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fact that must have played an important part when the Louisiana
redactors adopted this principle.6 0
Now although Toullier and Delvincourt borrowed from the
Prussian law in order to impose a period of irrevocability on an
offer, still for the time after the expiration of such period they
adhered to the civil law principle that an offer remains open until
revoked. 61 But the theory of the indefinite duration of an offer
was never strictly applied, and the acceptance which came so
long after the offer that the proposer could no longer be consid-
ered as having the intention to contract was not deemed binding."2
The redactors of the Civil Code of 1825 seem to have combined
these ideas, and it is therefore the writer's firm conviction that
this is the interpretation of the present problem in the Louisiana
law of offer and acceptance.
The Louisiana jurisprudence on offer and acceptance is un-
fortunate. Never have the courts succeeded in interpreting the
articles as a system, and the very inconsistency of the decisions
s4 les deux parties sont dloigndes l'une de I'autre, et que, dans Fintervalle des
offres 4 l'acceptation, P'offrant aft rdvoqu6 ses offres? Il faut distinguer: si
l'offrant a flxd un ddlat pour I'acceptation, Ri ne pout rdvoquer avant l'expi-
ration du ddlai; sinon, il dolt attendre un ddlai suffisant, pour quo l'autre
partie ait pu r~pondre, et que la rdponse ait pu lul parvenir. C'est ainsi
que ces questions sont ddcidds par le Code Prussien, partie Ire., tit. 5, art.
90 et suivans; et je pense qu'4l en seroit de mdme dane notre droit." 3 Del-
vincourt, op. cit. supra note 8, pp. 133-134 (Notes to p. 69; n. 2, par. 2).
"But at what time is a sale by correspondence considered made? At the
time when the offeror has received knowledge of the acceptance of the offer.
But what if the two parties are at a distance from each other, and in the
interval between the offer and the acceptance, the offeror has revoked his
offer? It Is necessary to distinguish: if the offeror has fixed a delay for
acceptance, he may not revoke until the expiration of the delay; if not, he
should await a delay sufficient for the other party to have answered, and for
the answer to have come to his knowledge. It Is In this manner that these
questions are decided in the Prussian Code, Part 1, tit. 5, art. 90 et seq; and
I suppose that the solution would be the same in our law."
60. Elements of the system, with varying modifications, are found in the
old Austrian Civil Code (Art. 862), and exist today in the Brazilian (Civil
Code, Arts. 1080, 1081), German (B.G.B., Arts. 147-149), Italian (Commercial
Code, Art. 36), Japanese (Civil Code, Arts. 251, 254; Commercial Code, Arts.
269, 270), and Mexican (Civil Code, Arts. 1289-1292) law, as well as being
provided for In the Projet of the Franco-Italian Code of Obligations (Art. 2).
Cf. the more modern expression of the same underlying idea: 'II est plus
simple de poser en thtse gdndrale que 7a sdcuritd des transactions impose que
l'offre ait ddj4 une valeur Juridique." Demogue, Trait6 des Obligations (1923)
163, no 553.
"It Is simpler to state as a general proposition that the security of
transactions makes it necessary that the offer have a juridical value."
61. 2 Delvincourt, op. cit. supra note 8, p. 458 (p. 122, n. 1, par. 1); 6 Toul-
Her, op. cit. supra note 7, Bk. III, Tit. III, no 26. See also Pardessus, op. cit.
supra note 49, no 250, par. 2.
62. Pardessus, op. cit. supra note 49, no 250, par. 5.
COMMENTS
manifests their confusion. The fact that the articles announced
principles of a system of law not generally known in a jurisdic-
tion more familiar with the French, Spanish, and Anglo-American
doctrines, rendered difficult their interpretation, and with the
two key articles mistranslated in the English from their French
originals, this confusion in the jurisprudence could not have been
avoided.6 3
SUMMARY
Summarizing, the essentials of the doctrine may be expressed
as follows:
I. An offer remains open and irrevocable:
A. For the time expressly or impliedly given for acceptance;
or
B. If no time has been given by the proposer in his offer-
for the time reasonably necessary for the acceptance and
its communication to the proposer; which is computed by
considering:
1. The time required for communication to and from
the party to whom the proposition was made:
a. In face to face offers (or offers by telephone or
radio), only an instant is required;
b. In proposals to parties at a distance, only the time
necessary for the transmission of the proposal and
the acceptance by the authorized or usual means of
communication is required;
and
2. The time required for the act of acceptance, according
to the nature of the contract:
63. Any adequate discussion of the jurisprudence would necessarily be
too lengthy, and, in view of what has been stated above, of little use other
than to emphasize the confusion in the decisions. For those who may wish to
consider the decisions, however, the following citations are given: Corryolles
v. Mossey, 2 La. 504 (1831); Ryder v. Frost, 3 La. Ann. 523 (1848); Byrd v. Cox,
15 La. Ann. 609 (1860); Dickson v. Dickson, 32 La. Ann. 272 (1880); Gordon v.
Stubbs, 36 La. Ann. 625 (1884); Peet & Co. v. Meyer, 42 La. Ann. 1034, 8 So.
534 (1890); Miller v. Douville & Gallagher, 45 La. Ann. 214, 12 So. 132 (1893);
Lachman & Jacobi v. Block, 47 La. Ann. 505, 17 So. 153 (1895); Nickerson v.
Allen Bros. & Wadley, 110 La. 194, 34 So. 410 (1903); Union Sawmill Co. v.
Lake Lbr. Co., 120 La. 106, 44 So. 1000 (1907); Blanks v. Sutcliffe, 122 La. 448,
47 So. 765 (1908); Shreveport Traction Co. v. Mulhaupt, 122 La. 667, 48 So. 144
(1909); Riley v. Union Sawmill Co., 122 La. 863, 48 So. 304 (1909); Union Saw-
mill Co. v. Mitchell, 122 La. 900, 48 So. 317 (1909); Heitman Co. v. Kansas City
Southern R. Co., 136 La. 825, 67 So. 895 (1915); Miller v. Oden, 149 La. 771, 90
So. 167 (1921); Barchus v. Johnson, 151 La. 985, 92 So. 566 (1922); Haneman v.
Uhry, 8 La. App. 534 (1928); Blanchard v. Greater Jefferson Realty Co., 9 La.
App. 492 (1929); Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. Harang, 10 La. App. 242
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a. In offers for bilateral contracts, this would be only
the moment necessary for the making of the prom-
ise;
b. In offers for unilateral contracts, this would be only
the time necessary for the performance of the act or
forbearance requested.
II. After the expiration of the delays in IA and IB, above, the
proposer is free to change his intention, and need not declare
so or notify the other party of such fact;
A. However, if the acceptance comes to his knowledge be-
fore the lapse of time mentioned in III, the proposer must
immediately notify the accepter of his change of intention
or be presumed to have continued in that intention and
be bound to the contract.
III. Yet, if the acceptance comes to the knowledge of the proposer
so long after his proposal that he cannot be presumed to be
still of the intention which his proposal expressed, the accept-
ance need not be considered more than a counter offer.
ROBERT A. PASCAL*
ADOPTION
The scope of the present inquiry includes the form and the
civil effects of adoption, particular attention being directed to the
new Adoption Act' and to its probable effect on Louisiana juris-
prudence.
Prior to 1865, adoption in Louisiana was possible only by
means of a special legislative act.2 Although adoption had existed
under the Spanish regime, it was abolished by the Code of 1808,4
(1929); Dreyfous Co. v. Keifer, 11 La. App. 364 (1929); Picou v. St. Bernard
Parish School Board, 132 So. 130 (La. App. 1924); Foster v. Morrison, 145 So.
13 (La. App. 1933).
* Senior student, Loyola University School of Law (New Orleans). The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor Henry G. McMa-
hon (Louisiana State University) and of Messrs. Felix Lapeyre and Stephen
B. Rodi (New Orleans).
1. La. Act 428 of 1938.
2. For examples of such adoptions, see La. Acts 26 and 65 of 1837; La.
Acts 69, 139, 217, and 235 of 1852; La. Act 100 of 1859.
3. Las Siete Partidas, 4.16.1-10.
4. La. Civil Code of 1808, p. 50, 1.7.35.
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